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INTERPRETIVE SOVEREIGNTY: A RESEARCH AGENDA
Kristen A. Carpenter*
Abstract
In federal Indian law, the treaty operates as our foundational legal text.
Reflecting centuries-old historical political arrangements between Indian
nations and the United States, treaties remain vital legal instruments that decide
dozens of legal cases each year. Yet, these treaties-originally drafted in
English by the federal government, following negotiations with tribal
representatives who usually spoke their own languages-present a number of
ambiguities for contemporary courts. The dominant model of treaty
interpretation is one in which judges interpret treaties in a manner they believe
to reflect Indians' understanding of treaty terms and, more generally, to
promote the interests of Indian nations. While this liberal approach to treaty
interpretation has secured a number of important Indian rights in the courts, it
does not necessarily reflect the ways in which Indians actually perceived treaty
terms in their own languages and cultures.
Deeper investigation of treaty law reveals that Indians have long been
interpreting treaties for themselves. From their earliest encounters on the
negotiating field to recent advocacy in the courts, Indians have, out of necessity
or strategy, articulated what treaty provisions mean to them. Here I identify this
much overlooked practice as "interpretive sovereignty" and define it as the
interpretation of treaties through the lens of tribal cultures and, more
particularly, through tribal languages. The practice of interpretive sovereignty
has particularly great potential today as a tribal language revitalization
movement sweeps Indian Country. Interpretive sovereignty may have the
power to transform historical understandings of treaties and help tribes forge
contemporary legal approaches that reflect tribal norms and values. Beyond
federal Indian law, attention to the role of language differences can inspire
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reflection on the interpretation of other legal texts. For these reasons, this essay
calls for research into the role of tribal languages in treaty interpretation and
begins to contemplate some of the challenges associated with such work.
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I. Introduction
In this essay, I raise the question of what it might mean to interpret Indian
treaties through the lens of tribal languages. Each of the hundreds of treaties
executed between the United States and Indian nations from 1778-1871' was
drafted in English.2 Yet in many, if not most, instances the Indian tribes were
1. These treaties are reprinted in INDIAN TREATIES: 1778-1883 (Charles J. Kappler ed.,
1972) (facsimile reprint of 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES (Charles J. Kappler ed.,
1904)). For general background on the American Indian treaty tradition, see generally FRANCIS
PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL ANOMALY (1994);
ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN TREATY VISIONS OF
LAW & PEACE, 1600-1800 (1999); VINE DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES
(1974).
2. See Russel Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood Henderson, Contrary Jurisprudence:
Tribal Interests in Navigable Waterways Before and After Montana v. United States, 56 WASH.
L. REv. 627, 652 n.157 (1981) (noting that the United States did not follow the international
practice of multilingual treaty drafting in its dealings with Indian tribes). In this regard, the
treaty process in the United States differed significantly from that in New Zealand where there
has long been an official Maori version of the Treaty of Waitangi, for example. See, e.g.,
RICHARD DAWSON, THE TREATY OF WAITANGI AND THE CONTROL OF LANGUAGE (2001). This
alternative model suggests fertile ground for a comparative work examining treaty interpretation
issues growing out of multilingual versus monolingual treaties. See Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969); Dinah Shelton,
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represented by leaders speaking tribal languages who worked through
translators to negotiate terms with federal agents.' As a result of linguistic and
cultural differences, compounded by political and military disparities, treaty
terms may not have been translated perfectly between tribal languages and
English.4 From the earliest treaty meetings, tribal people may have understood
treaties differently than did their federal counterparts.' Unsurprisingly then, in
the years following treaty negotiations, tribal people have also used their own
languages to advance tribal understandings of treaty provisions in federal
litigation, tribal courts, and other settings.6
My initial research suggests that while tribes have long used tribal languages
in the treaty negotiation and interpretation process, their efforts in this regard
remain somewhat overlooked by courts and scholars.7 We have not examined
in any detail how key treaty concepts may have been, and continue to be,
expressed differently in tribal languages than in English. This essay thus offers
a modest step toward articulating a research agenda around the role of tribal
language in treaty interpretation. Part II describes some of the challenges of the
federal common law approach to treaty interpretation, calling particular
attention to the "Indian canons of construction" that require courts to interpret
treaties "as the Indians would have understood" them. Without attempting to
propose a new rule of federal treaty construction, this part nevertheless raises
the possibility that judicial understandings of treaty terms might be enhanced
by reference to the unique ways in which certain legal concepts are expressed
in tribal languages. Part III identifies several instances where tribes have used
tribal languages in treaty interpretation, pointing to examples where such acts
of interpretive sovereignty have, to varying extents, influenced federal and
tribal court decisions. Part III also comments briefly on issues of available
Reconcilable Differences? The Interpretation of Multilingual Treaties, 20 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMp. L. REV. 611,612 (1997) (identifying "problem of interpreting multilingual treaties where
mistaken or deliberate mistranslations result in conflicting versions of the treaty text").
3. See, e.g., JILL ST. GERMAIN, INDIAN TREATY-MAKING IN THE UNITED STATES AND
CANADA: 1867-1877, at 60-79 (2001).
4. See infra Parts II-IV.
5. See, e.g., NATIvE AMERICAN TESTIMONY: A CHRONICLE OF INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS
FROM PROPHECY TO THE PRESENT, 1492-1992, at 117-44 (Peter Nabokov ed., 1991)
(documenting American Indian attitudes toward treaties).
6. See infra Part Ill.
7. Although U.S. scholars have not focused on the role of indigenous languages in treaty
interpretation, this is a question of great interest in New Zealand where the Treaty of Waitangi
(1840) was drafted with English and Maori language versions, leading to numerous questions
of interpretation. See, e.g., DAWSON, supra note 2; MICHAEL BELGRAVE ET AL., WAITANGI
REVISITED: PERSPECTIVES ON THE TREATY OF WAITANGI (2d ed. 2005).
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source material, including written records and oral traditions; acknowledges that
the challenges may differ when a federal versus tribal institution is undertaking
the treaty interpretation process; and contrasts the projects of ascertaining
historic versus contemporary Indian understandings of treaty terms. Part IV
attempts to situate these varied acts of interpretive sovereignty against a
scholarly backdrop, drawing from legal, literary, and linguistic theory to
propose several lines of future inquiry. Part V concludes with some thoughts
about interpretive sovereignty in light of the language revitalization movement
currently alive in Indian Country, attempting to link some of the judicial and
scholarly questions with issues actually faced by Indian communities today.
II. Problems of Language in Interpretation
Words matter in our foundational legal texts. s When faced with our nation's
most pressing legal questions, for example, Americans parse the Constitution
carefully for answers. Whether they advocate strict fidelity to the black letter
text or a more dynamic method of interpretation,9 citizens and courts
demonstrate remarkable belief in the transcendent power of constitutional
language drafted nearly two hundred fifty years ago to govern our nation
today." Like constitutional law, federal Indian law often rests on the
application of historic words to contemporary circumstances. Here the
8. We might even describe Indian treaties as "sacred texts" having a transcendent
importance in law and politics. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism,
in LEE C. BOLLINGER AND R. STONE, EDS., ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN
ERA 176 (2001) ) (characterizing the First Amendment role as a "sacred text," in its function
as an "an argumentative showstopper" that can subsume broad "political, social, cultural,
ideological, economic, and moral claims."). For some tribal people treaties are "sacred texts"
with both legal and spiritual dimensions. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 47-49. In this regard,
Indian treaties might provide an interesting basis for comparison with sacred texts such as the
Torah or Koran. See, e.g., Susan W. Tiefenbrun, The Semiotics of Women's Human Rights in
Iran, 23 CONN. J. INT'L. 1 & n. 680 (2007) (on textual sources and interpretive ambiguity in
Islamic traditions).
9. For a small sampling of the many works on methods of Constitutional interpretation,
see STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION
(2005); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). For a discussion of approaches to legislative interpretation, see
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (2d ed. 2006).
10. Compare Bruce Ackerman, TheLiving Constitution, 120 HARv. L. REv. 1737, 1752-53
(2000) (calling the Constitution a sacred text) with Ethan J. Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of
Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 353, 363 n.25 (2008) (critiquing the same
idea).
[Vol. 33
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foundational legal text is the treaty--or, more precisely, hundreds of treaties
that were executed between the United States and Indian nations from 1778-
1871.1 Each is a political compact between a tribe and the United States,
setting forth power-sharing arrangements between the national and tribal
governments. 2 Like other venerable legal instruments, treaties remain vital
despite their age, operating as the "supreme law of the land."13
As a practical matter, a treaty is sometimes the critical legal document in
contemporary Indian law cases. 4 Thus, it is still true that in 2008, treaties
affect issues of taxation, jurisdiction, civil rights, and hunting and fishing that
affect American Indians and other U.S. citizens.' 5 Treaty interpretation is,
however, challenging. Courts often confront questions familiar from
constitutional law, including how to ascertain the drafters' original intent in
choosing particular legal terms and how to apply such archaic terms to
contemporary circumstances. 6 Additionally, treaties raise special problems of
language, culture, and power. The treaties were executed in English-but the
Indian parties did not always speak English. Indeed, they spoke hundreds of
languages as unrelated to each other, and to English, as Hebrew and Mandarin.
As linguistic anthropology has revealed, people who speak different languages
may see the world differently or at least talk about it differently. 7 Certain
concepts may not translate perfectly between cultural groups.'8 Such
differences in ways of seeing and naming the world may offer a partial
explanation for dozens of"misunderstandings" between European or American
and Indian treaty parties. 9
Oren Lyons has, for example, attributed what is perhaps the most notorious
treaty misunderstanding of all time to such differences:
11. See supra note 1.
12. For a view of treaties as "quasi-constitutional" instruments that set forth the "structural
framework and linkages between the United States and the tribe for what promised to be a
longstanding, if not eternal, sovereign-to-sovereign relationship," see generally Philip P.
Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism and Interpretation in
Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REv. 381, 385 (1993) [hereinafter Frickey, Marshalling].
13. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
14. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
15. See cases cited infra Parts III-IV; see infra note 175.
16. See supra note 9.
17. HARRIET JOSEPH OTrENHEIMER, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF LANGUAGE: AN
INTRODUCTION TO LINGUISTIC ANTHROPOLOGY 29 (2008).
18. Id.
19. See KEITH H. BASSO, PORTRAITS OF THE WHITEMAN (1979) (discussing American
Indian perspectives on Anglo-American speech patterns).
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When [the Dutch] asked if they could buy Manhattan, well, of
course, how could you talk a concept of "buy and sell" with a
people who didn't have that concept. All of the Native people
understood that this was a neutral ground and a ground where
people shared. The idea of our white brothers coming across the sea
would be welcome here. And if they chose to give a small gift for
that, that was fine, that was nice and we were in appreciation.
And we still hear about that today. There is a lot of laughter
involved .... you sold Manhattan for twenty-four guilders. And we
say.., well, we don't understand that. Nevertheless we think at the
time what was struck was an agreement to share something. When
the Indians arrived next year, they found fences. The [Indians] said,
"What is this? We're coming back to fish and hunt." They said,
"Well, you sold it." "What do you mean we sold it"?
20
While genuine problems of language and cultural differences may have
explained some treaty misunderstandings, these problems were certainly
compounded by other factors. After 1800, the United States began to approach
tribes as diminished sovereigns whose military and social strength no longer
threatened the nation." Even as the tribes continued to negotiate in good faith,
the United States made promises that it intended to break shortly thereafter.2
The government employed duress, such as military force and the withholding
of rations, to induce tribal compliance.23 And it sometimes manipulated
language differences to its advantage. 24 To the extent that tribes had access to
20. The Native Americans: The Nations of the Northeast: Interview of Oren Lyons (Turner
Broadcasting Systems television broadcast 1994).
21. VINE DELORIA JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES: AN INDIAN
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 110 (1974).
22. THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NATIVE AMERICAN LEGAL TRADITION 331-32 (Bruce Elliot
Johansen ed., 1998).
23. See, e.g., Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Courts of the Conqueror, 41 AM.
U. L. REv. 753, 823 n.411 (1992) (describing that in events leading up to the Sioux people's
signing of the Treaty of Ft. Laramie of 1868, the Government attached a "sell-or-starve" rider
to the treaty during the winter when the Government prevented the tribe from hunting, moved
most of the members into stockades, and threatened to withhold rations if they did not agree to
the treaty).
24. Nell Jessup Newton, Compensation, Reparations, & Restitution: Indian Property
Claims in The United States, 28 GA. L. REv. 453, 459 n.20 (1994) (noting the challenge for
treaty translators to describe concepts of individually held fee simple title to Indians with their
own traditions of common ownership and use rights-but observing that "sloppy and dishonest
translations" also clouded negotiation process).
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translators, these were often provided by the government, which also drafted the
instruments and presented them to Congress. 5 As a result, the Indian parties
sometimes complained that the terms ultimately ratified in a treaty were
different from the terms they had negotiated in the field.26
These historical problems raise pressing questions about interpretation. How
should courts approach such documents whose very origins were clouded by
differences of language, culture, and power? Fortunately, federal common law
provides some guidance. The Supreme Court has long held that treaties must
be liberally interpreted in favor of Indian tribes, consistent with the so-called
"Indian canons of construction".27 Under the canons, the courts should not hold
an "unlettered people" to the strict meaning of legal terms written in a language
that they did not speak.2" Instead, the courts should resolve any textual
ambiguities in favor of the Indians and interpret the treaties "as the Indians
would have understood them. 29
In their application of the canons, federal courts have long attempted just
that-to read treaties consistent with Indian intent. Many judges try to evaluate
what treaty terms would mean in specific tribal cultural and historical contexts.
Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall's 1832 opinion that gave rise to the Indian
canons was based, in part, on his realization that Cherokees may have
25. Compare Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899) ("[T]he Indians, on the other hand,
are a weak and dependent people, who have no written language and are wholly unfamiliar with
all the forms of legal expression, and whose only knowledge of the terms in which the treaty
is framed is that imparted to them by the interpreter employed by the United States.") with Julia
E. Sullivan, LegalAnalysis of the Treaty Violations that Resulted in theNezPerce War Of1 877,
40 IDAHo L. REv. 657, 685 n.92 (2004) (noting that while federal agents promised that the
written treaty of 1855 would comport with oral representations made to Nez Perce negotiators,
Nez Perce did not demand to have the final treaty reviewed by their own translators). But see
ST. GERMAIN,supra note 3, at 60-79 (offering a more optimistic view of tribes that were well-
served in treaty negotiations by skilled translators, often including tribal members).
26. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 556-57 (1903) (Supreme Court
admitted that the form of the treaty presented to, and ratified by, Congress "did not exactly
conform to the agreement as signed by the Indians"). Professor Porter goes further, arguing that
in some instances, language problems caused Indians to "consent" to treaties that "could never
have been agreed to in accordance with tribal law." See Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal
Sovereignty Through Peacemaking: How the Anglo-American Legal Tradition Destroys
Indigenous Societies, 20 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 235, 265 (1997).
27. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
28. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380 (1905) ("[W]e will construe a treaty with
the Indians as 'that unlettered people' understood it.").
29. United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 116 (1938); Choctaw Nation v.
Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970).
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understood two key treaties differently than did the federal government.3 ° He
thus proceeded to interpret the treaty language as he believed the Cherokees
would have understood it, construing ambiguous language in their favor,
consistent with the overall spirit of the negotiations and the relationship
between the United States and the tribe.3
The Cherokees thus retained inherent authority over their land base even
though the treaty was not crystal clear on that point. Article Four set forth the
"boundary allotted to the Cherokees for their hunting ground."3 2 Article Nine
granted Congress exclusive authority to regulate trade with the Cherokees and
to "manag[e] all their affairs."33 Marshall construed these articles to mean that
the Cherokee Nation reserved inherent authority over its lands, and the United
States promised to protect such autonomy, to the exclusion of state law.34 Even
those who agree with the substantive outcome might marvel at the legal and
linguistic leap. How did he get from terms that were, at best, ambiguous with
respect to the Indians' situation, into a relatively broad reservation of Indian
rights?
First, Marshall suggested that it was not "reasonable" to assume that
"Indians, who could not write, and most probably could not read, who certainly
were not critical judges of our language" would be able to differentiate between
the verb "allotted" (suggesting a federal power to grant property) and a term
such as "marked out" (more neutrally suggesting the establishment of a
boundary between equal sovereigns).35 The neutral reading would be more
consistent with the nature of the negotiation in which the Cherokees "were
ceding lands to the United States, and describing the extent of their cession" and
not, in fact, "receiving" any lands.36
The same went, Marshall said, for construction of the term "hunting
grounds." He wrote that because "[h]unting was at that time the principal
occupation of the Indians, and their land was more used for that purpose than
for any other," the Cherokees would not have had "any intention ... of
restricting the full use of the lands they reserved."37 Moreover, such intent was
30. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 553-54 (1832). For a broader view of
this period of Cherokee treaty history and removal, see Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases:
A Study in Law, Politics and Morality, 21 STAN. L. REv. 500 (1969).
31. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 554.
32. Treaty of Hopewell art. IV, U.S.-Cherokee Nation, Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18.
33. Id. at art. IX.
34. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 521.
35. Id. at 552.
36. Id. at 553.
37. Id.
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reconcilable with the interests of the United States for which "it could be a
matter of no concern, whether their whole territory was devoted to hunting
grounds, or whether an occasional village, and an occasional corn field,
interrupted, and gave some variety to the scene."38
Indeed, Marshall seems to suggest that the contested terms may not have
even been precisely selected for the Treaties of Hopewell and Holston. In a
passage almost evoking our contemporary notions of "boilerplate" drafting
language, Marshall observed that "[t]hese terms had been used in their treaties
with Great Britain, and had never been misunderstood."39 In their historic
usage, such terms "had never been supposed to imply a right in the British
government to take their lands, or to interfere with their internal [tribal]
government." 40
In this way Marshall found, in treaty language setting the boundaries of a
tribal hunting ground, a Cherokee reservation of territorial possession and
sovereignty and not (as Anglo-Americans might have read it) as "at most an
exclusive license to hunt."' And in the treaty provision of a congressional right
to manage the Indians' affairs, Marshall found a federal obligation to protect the
Cherokee Nation from the incursions of aggressive states.42 Yet, for all of its
protection of Indian interests, the opinion never seriously or specifically probed
Cherokee intent. It never addressed the question of how the Cherokees actually
understood key treaty terms. How did the Cherokees actually understand the
Article Four language on the boundary allotted to them as a hunting ground or
the Article Nine language granting Congress regulation of trade and other
affairs? The opinion does not say.
Thus, despite his sympathetic orientation, it seems possible that Marshall
may have substituted his own "understanding" of the treaties for that of the
Cherokees. And while he intended to set forth a legal rule protecting the
Cherokees from incursions of Georgia citizens and the national removal
movement, the Worcester opinion could not quell political tensions on the
ground. A mere six years after Worcester, the Executive Branch ordered the
Cherokees to be relocated to Indian Territory, in part through a forced march




41. See Frickey, Marshalling, supra note 12, at 400.
42. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 521, 554.
43. The Trail of Tears is documented in numerous sources. See, e.g., ROBERT J. CONLEY,
THE CHEROKEE NATION: A HISTORY (2005). Yet, one documentary is particularly notable for
capturing this history through narrative in the Cherokee language. See THE TRAIL OF TEARS:
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their traditional eastern land base-including individual homes, fields, religious
sites, and personal property-as well as thousands of Cherokee lives and
collective tribal lifeways.
The immediate aftermath of Worcesterreflected many circumstances beyond
Marshall's purview as a justice, and this essay does not mean to make
unsupportable contentions about his approach to treaty interpretation and the
fate of the Cherokees. Yet, Worcester did set forth a particular method of treaty
interpretation in which judges enjoy a considerable amount of latitude in
deciding how the Indians "would have" understood treaties and that their
exercise of this power has consequences for Indian people. Of course many
judicial opinions are informed by the Indian parties' own arguments outlining
the tribal perspective on treaty interpretation." However, the reality is that
judges remain free to impose their own view of what treaty construction would,
in the court's mind, benefit the tribe-or to ignore the Indian canons altogether
as the Supreme Court sometimes does. 45 Even if a court has the best intentions,
limitations of history, culture, and language make it difficult to set forth an
interpretation that reflects the Indians' actual understanding of treaties. 6 As a
result, the treaty interpretations appearing in federal case law may fail to reflect
Indian understandings and, perhaps relatedly, fail to set forth rules that actually
work for Indians in Indian Country. 7
CHEROKEE LEGACY (Rich-Heape Films Inc. 2006).
44. A point for future investigation is whether the Cherokee Nation made any language-
interpretation issues in its Worcesterbriefs that maybe available in the archives of the Cherokee
Phoenix newspaper. See Bethany R. Berger, United States v. Lara as a Story of Native Agency,
40 TULSA L. REv. 5, 8 (2004). At this point in my research I have examined limited portions
of the appellate record and these do not seem to raise issues of language or translation. See
Samuel E. Worcester, Plaintiff in Error Versus the State of Georgia, Supreme Court of the
United States, No. 98, Win. Thos. Carroll, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States (on
file with author).
45. See, e.g., Kristen A. Carpenter, Interpreting Indian Country in State ofAlaska v. Native
Village ofVenetie, 35 TULSAL.J. 73 (1999) (criticizing Supreme Court's failure to apply Indian
canons).
46. See Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation
in Federal Indian Law, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1754, 1778 (1997) [hereinafter Frickey,
Adjudication] (describing the tendency of federal courts to ignore Indian viewpoints on law).
47. Compare with Frickey, Marshalling, supra note 12, at 409 (considering Marshall's
view of "a constitution as the constitutive document of a complex government in an ever-
evolving society; if the document that provides the undergirding and framework for that
government cannot serve functional ends over time, the society will founder").
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II. Interpretive Sovereignty
In part II, I argued that the dominant model of treaty interpretation is one in
which non-Indian judges and other legal practitioners promulgate a treaty
interpretation that they believe to reflect Indians' understanding of treaty terms
and, more broadly, to reflect Indians' best interests. There is, however, another
tradition of treaty interpretation, one in which Indians articulate for themselves
the ways in which they historically understood, and continue to understand,
treaty language. In this essay, I identify this largely overlooked tradition as
"interpretive sovereignty" and define it as the practice of interpreting treaties
through the lense of tribal cultures and, more particularly, through tribal
languages.
Tribes have, of course, been engaged in acts of interpretive sovereignty for
centuries. In the contemporary era of tribal language revitalization, indigenous
peoples are likely to engage in such practices with renewed vigor. Their
interpretations may reveal new ways of understanding key treaty terms. For
these reasons, and others described below, I believe that the practice of
interpretive sovereignty, in its historical and contemporary forms, merits greater
attention from scholars and advocates.
This Part discusses several types of sources that may shed light on historical
uses of tribal language in treaty interpretation. It then discusses federal and
tribal court cases in which the courts recognized language issues in treaty
interpretation. This Part acknowledges that the challenges may differ when a
federal versus tribal institution is undertaking the treaty interpretation
process-and contrasts the projects of ascertaining historic versus
contemporary Indian understandings of treaty terms.
A. A Few Words on Sources
The first acts of interpretive sovereignty occurred on the negotiating field.
Indians spoke through translators to their European and American treaty
partners and conferred among themselves as treaties were negotiated.48 Yet, it
is difficult to unearth such contemporaneous tribal translations. One potentially
valuable resource is treaty records, commonly called "treaty minutes." '49 Going
48. See, e.g., BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, PENNSYLVANIA, AND THE FIRST NATIONS: THE
TREATIES OF 1736-62, at ix-xiv (Susan Kalter ed., 2006) [hereinafter KALTER] (discussing
language issues in early treaties); see also id. at 377 (quoting Oneida speaker at a 1762 treaty
conference as saying, "I am sorry we cannot speak to one another any faster, because we cannot
understand one another without so many Interpreters").
49. See Gavin Clarkson, Reclaiming Jurisprudential Sovereignty: A Tribal Judiciary
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back to the seventeenth century, clerks or other witnesses kept
contemporaneous records of treaty negotiations. These documents contain
valuable accounts of Indian speeches given during treaty negotiations. As one
commentator writes, "[I]n no other source did ethnocentric Euro-Americans
preserve with less distortion a memoir of Indian thoughts, concerns, and
interpretations of events. '50  However, "[treaty minutes] are fraught with
problems: interpreters' linguistic skills are suspect; clerks frequently tired of
long Indian 'harangues' and noted only what they considered to be the high
points; and deliberate falsification sometimes occurred."'" Of course treaty
minutes are typically recorded in English or other European languages. Thus
while they may reveal much about Indian perspectives on treaty negotiations,
they may be only a partial window into tribal language issues. For example, in
the Washington fishing cases, described below, treaty records show that
language issues were problematic but generally do not record the words actually
used by Indian parties or their translators."
By contrast, many tribes retain in their own oral traditions detailed
information about treaty terms, in their own voices and often in their own
languages. Such stories have been passed down from the original ancestors who
witnessed or heard about treaty negotiations and many of these contain
important substantive information about the tribal perspectives.53 These stories
have the potential to serve as counter-narratives, or perhaps complementary-
narratives, to federal treaty interpretations.
Analysis, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 473, 498 n. 166 (2002) ("Treaty literature, including the treaty
minutes, accounts of interactions by traders, and other anthropologic and historical accounts
should be examined to add to the understanding of the traditional essence of Choctaw
jurisprudence.").
50. Daniel K. Richter, RediscoveredLinks in the Covenant Chain: Previously Unpublished
Transcripts of New York Indian Treaty Minutes, 1677-1691, 92 PROc. OF THE AM.
ANTIQUARIAN Soc'Y 45, 47-48 (1982).
51. Id. at 47. The federal courts have taken note of these problems in some cases. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bouchard, 464 F. Supp. 1316, 1323 (W.D. Wis. 1978) ("The accounts of what
was said [by Indians and government representatives in treaty negotiations], of course, are only
of what was understood by the white men. [Secretary of the Treaty Council] Van Antwerp
commented after one particularly clumsy passage in his notes: 'This of course is nonsense but
is given literally as rendered by the Intrepeters (sic) who are unfit to act in that capacity. I
presume it to mean ... "').
52. See infra notes 66-68.
53. See, e.g., Andrew H. Fisher, "This IKnowfrom the OldPeople": Yakama Indian Treaty
Rights as Oral Tradition, MONTANA: MAG. OFW. HIST., Spring 1999, at 49 [hereinafter Fisher,
This I Know].
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Historian Andrew Fisher, whose work is described in further detail below,
notes the role of the oral tradition in several important respects. Rather than
reading the treaties or written accounts of them, tribal people often "absorbed
... verbal explanations" of treaty provisions given by their own leaders,
interpreters, and government agents. 4 Such accounts carried great weight in
cultures where the oral transmission of knowledge was legitimate and
effective.55 While oral histories raise some evidentiary challenges in litigation,
tribal litigants have sometimes presented such evidence effectively, working
closely with expert witnesses from the fields of anthropology, ethnology, and
linguistics.5 6
In addition to the oral tradition, some tribes have created their own written
records of treaty matters. These include tribal leaders' letters and speeches,
historical works, and other sources. There are some particularly unique sources
illuminating language issues. For example, the Ojibwe prepared an 1864
document titled "Statement by the Indians: A Bilingual Petition" detailing their
understanding of the 1837, 1842, and 1854 treaties. 7 In 1850, the Cherokee
Nation commissioned the translation, from English into the Cherokee syllabary,
of a substantial body of federal law affecting the Cherokee Nation. 8 This
54. Andrew H. Fisher, Tangled Nets: Treaty Rights and Tribal Identities at Celilo Falls,
105 OR. HIST. Q. 179, 9 (2004), http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/ohq/1 05.2/fisher.
html#REF 10 [hereinafter Fisher, Tangled Nets].
55. Ojibwe scholar Patty Loew provides an interesting account of the role of oral tradition
in treaty negotiations, noting that the Ojibwe felt they had been misled by the 1837 and 1842
treaties. This was because Ojibwe had committed those treaties to memory and "[tiheir
memorized version differed from the written version." As ChiefNa-gon-ab explained in 1854:
"You go to your black marks and say this is what those men put down; this is what they said
when they made the treaty. The men we talk with don't come back; they do not come and you
tell us they did not tell us so." PATTY LOEW, INDIAN NATIONS OF WISCONSIN: HISTORIES OF
ENDURANCE AND RENEWAL 62-63 (2001).
56. One famous legal decision incorporating indigenous oral traditions is the Canadian
Supreme Court's decision in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 1067,
1071. U.S. courts may remain somewhat skeptical of such evidence as suggested in scholarship
criticizing the marginalization of oral histories in the Mashpee land claims. See, e.g., Gerald
Torres & Kathryn Milun, Translating Yonnondio by Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee
Indian Case, DUKE L.J. 625, 628-30, 658 (1990); James Clifford, Identity in Mashpee, in
READINGS IN AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 19-26 (Jo Carillo ed., 1998).
57. See LOEW, supra note 55, at 133-34 n.6. The Ojibwe petition "was published in 1988
by the University of Western Ontario as part of its series Studies in the Interpretation of
Canadian Native American Languages and Cultures. [It] is in the Wisconsin Historical Society
Archives, Madison." Id.
58. See RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN TO
COURT 115 (1975) [hereinafter STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPIRrrs].
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project included the Treaties of Hopewell and Holston famously interpreted by
Chief Justice Marshall in the pre-Removal cases described above. Funding for
this project became available in 1870, at which point the Cherokee printing
press at Park Hill, Oklahoma, published the documents. 9
Such examples of interpretive sovereignty provide fertile ground for
studying tribal perspectives on treaties. They raise a number of questions. What
can tribes learn by examining such treaty interpretations undertaken by their
ancestors during the treaty era? Do tribal translations materially depart from the
English-language version of treaties? Is it strategically wise for tribes to raise
such arguments in litigation over treaty rights?6" Does the historical
interpretation of treaties by tribal ancestors have a role to play in the
contemporary regulation of treaty rights by the tribe and other governments?61
How might contemporary tribal members reconcile competing or ambiguous
treaty interpretations handed down through the generations?
From ajudicial perspective, how shouldthe courts try to ascertain the tribes'
treaty intent in light of the problems of language described above? As the
Washington case suggests the treaty records will almost always be in English
and they will more accurately and completely reflect the intent of the federal,
versus Indian, parties. Can a court meaningfully carry out the canons, and defer
to the Indian treaty interpretation, if the evidence largely reflects the federal
treaty interpretation? To what extent can courts turn to oral tradition and
linguistic evidence, in conjunction with ethnographic, anthropological, and
historical testimony, in order to obtain a more complete record than the treaty
minutes might provide? And, in what ways mightjudicial treaty interpretations
be limited if they cannot account for issues of language and culture in their
decisions?
B. Federal Judicial Opinions
Some federal courts have recognized problems of language in treaty
interpretation, perhaps most famously in the 1970s Washington fishing cases.
59. The Cherokee syllabary version of the treaties, printed in 1870, is somewhat scarce
today. I located it in two institutions: the University of Oklahoma, Norman, and the Newberry
Library in Chicago (from which I was actually able to obtain copies).
60. One area of inquiry for a future project is the extent to which treaty interpretation
arguments were made in the Indian Claims Commission, a special tribunal created by Congress
to adjudicate "ancient claims" against the United States. See Indian Claims Commission Act
of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-426, ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049.
61. See Columbia River Inter-tribal Fish Comm'n, The Importance of Salmon to the Tribes,
http://www.critfc.org/text/salmcult.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2009) (describing role of "salmon
culture" in contemporary exercise of treaty rights).
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There the issue was the scope of off-reservation fishing rights under twelve
treaties negotiated in 1854-55.62 The court observed that the Columbia River
Indian tribes63 would have been translating treaty terms through several
languages:
There is no record of English having been spoken at the treaty
councils, but it is probable that there were Indians at each council
who would have spoken or understood some English. One
Snohomish Indian who understood English helped translate the
Point Elliott treaty. Since, however, the vast majority of Indians at
the treaty councils did not speak or understand English, the treaty
provisions and the remarks of the treaty commissioners were
interpreted by Colonel Shaw to the Indians in the Chinook jargon
and then translated into native languages by Indian interpreters.
Chinook jargon, a trade medium of limited vocabulary and simple
grammar, was inadequate to express precisely the legal effects of the
treaties, although the general meaning of treaty language could be
explained. Many of those present, however, did not understand
Chinook jargon. 4
The question before the court in Washington, more than one hundred years
after the treaties were negotiated, was how the Indians understood the following
treaty provisions:
The right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and
stations, is further secured to said Indians, in common with all
62. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aft'd, 520 F.2d 675
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976).
63. In this article I refer collectively (and somewhat imprecisely) to the "Columbia River
Tribes" or "Washington Indians" to refer to those involved in the Washington case, which
included the Hoh; Lower Elwha Band of Clallam Indians; Lummi; Makah; Muckleshoot;
Nisqually; Nooksack; Port Gamble Band of Ciallam Indians; Puyallup; Quileute; Quinault;
Sauk-Suiattle; Skokomish; Squaxin Island; Stillaguamish; Suquamish; Swinomish; and Tulalip.
The contemporary federally recognized tribes that exercise such treaty rights today are the Nez
Perce Tribe, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, the Confederated
Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon, and the Confederated Tribes and Bands of
the Yakama Indian Nation. See Columbia River Inter-tribal Fish Commission, Columbia River
Treaty Tribes, http://www.critfc.org/text/tribes.html (last visited Jan. 1,2009). For an excellent
book featuring community perspectives and documentary on the treaties and related issues, see
JOSEPH C. DuPRIs, KATHLEEN S. HILL & WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., THE SI'LAILO WAY:
INDIANS, SALMON AND LAW ON THE COLUMBIA RIVER (2006).
64. Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 355-56.
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citizens of the territory, and of erecting temporary houses for the
purpose of curing them, together with the privileges of hunting,
gathering roots and berries, and pasturing their horses and cattle
upon open and unclaimed land.65
Such language, the court noted, had to be construed "not according to the
technical meaning of its words to learned lawyers, but in the sense in which
they would naturally be understood by the Indians." Yet, ascertaining the
Indians' understanding was not an easy task:
There is no record of the Chinook jargon phrase that was actually
used in the treaty negotiations to interpret the provision "The right
of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations, is
further secured to said Indians, in common with all citizens of the
Territory." A dictionary of the Chinookj argon, prepared by George
Gibbs, indicates that the jargon contains no words or expressions
that would describe any limiting interpretation on the right of taking
fish.
The treaty language "in common with all citizens of the
Territory" was probably introduced by George Gibbs, who was a
lawyer and advisor to Governor Stevens. There is no discussion of
the phrase in the minutes of the treaty councils, in the instructions
to Stevens or to the treaty negotiators, or in Stevens' letters of
transmittal of the treaties. There appears to be no phrase in the
Chinook jargon that would interpret the term in any exact legal
sense.
67
The court thus concluded there was "no evidence of the precise
understanding the Indians had of the treaty language." 8 Having given up on
establishing the Indians' exact intent, the court consulted the 1828 and 1862
editions of Webster's American Dictionary of the English Language to
determine the meaning that federal negotiators' would have ascribed to the key
terms, including the notion of "common ownership".69 Trying to reconcile the
65. Id. at331.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 356.
68. Id.
69. See id. (citing 1828 and 1862 editions of Webster's American Dictionary ofthe English
Language) ("accustomed: Being familiar by use; habituated; inured... usual; often practiced.
common: Belonging equally to more than one, or to many indefinitely... belonging to the
public; having no separate owner ... general; serving for the use of all. usual: Customary;
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plain English meaning with what he knew of Chinook, Judge Boldt decided that
the Indians' negotiators "probably understood the concept of common
ownership interest which could have been conveyed in Chinook jargon. '70 In
a similar vein, the phrase "'usual and accustomed' ... was all-inclusive and
intended by all parties to the treaty to include reservation and off-reservation
areas" but probably did not "intend[] to include areas where use was occasional
or incidental.",71 Moreover, the court noted, the treaty council records gave no
indication that the Indians had been instructed of any limits on "their existing
fishing activities or tribal control over them."7' From the context, however,
they may have understood that non-Indians would also be allowed to take fish
alongside the Indians. 3 Significantly, the court suggests that one of the main
factors inducing the Indians to enter into treaty negotiations, "sell their land for
a moderate sum of money," and "to accept... reservations" was the promise
of off-reservation fishing rights.74
Perhaps because of the difficulty of reconstructing the contemporaneous
Indian translations, Judge Boldt next turned to anthropological experts to assess
the role of fishing in Columbia River Indian cultures at the time of the treaties.75
He determined that tribes relied on fishing for subsistence, conducted religious
rites associated with the fish, distributed fishing rights at various locations
among kinship groups, regulated fishing consistent with tribal custom
prohibiting waste, and engaged in trade with other tribes.76
Such analysis seemed to represent the court's attempt to comply with the
Indian canon which, as Judge Boldt described it, required that "treaties with
common; frequent; such as occurs in ordinary practice or in the ordinary course of events.").
70. Id. Compare with CHARLES F. WILKINSON, MESSAGES FROM FRANK'S LANDING: A
STORY OF SALMON, TREATIES, AND THE INDIAN WAY 11 (2000) ("Like pidgin English, the
Chinookj argon was a rudimentary device for trade, a patchwork of English, French and various
tribal languages. How could it possibly speak to sovereignty, land ownership, fishing rights,
assimilation, freedom, or the futures of societies.").
71. Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 356.
72. Id. at 357.
73. Id.
74. Id. The court further noted:
While there is no record of any specific privileges discussed during these contacts
[meetings preceding the treaty negotiations], the treaty commission's prior
awareness of the importance the Indians attached to fishing makes it probable that
the continuance of the right to take fish was one that Shaw had in mind or
discussed.
Id.
75. Id. at 351-53.
76. Id.
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Indian tribes must be construed liberally in accordance with the meaning they
were understood to have by the tribal representatives at the treaty council and
in a spirit which generously recognizes the full obligation of this nation to
protect the interests of a dependent people."" Accordingly, the court held that
the treaties reserved distinct rights to the Indians including the right to fish in
"areas where the Indians fished during treaty times," to take a volume of fish
sufficient for the Indians "fair needs," and to regulate off-reservation fishing by
members, subject only to non-Indians' rights to take their own fair share and the
state's right to regulate for conservation purposes."8
By all accounts, the Washington decision was revolutionary in its generous
interpretation of off-reservation fishing, particularly in a political climate hostile
to such rights.79 Yet, according to Judge Boldt's own description, he wrote the
decision with "no evidence of the precise understanding the Indians had of the
treaty language."8 Thus, we can observe the pathbreaking quality of the
Washington decision and its tremendous benefit for Indian sovereignty, but still
ask whether the decision might omit certain perspectives informed by, or
expressed in, tribal languages.
Consider, for example, how information available in tribal oral traditions
may further inform issues in the Washington case. As an example, Fisher
points to critical language in the 1854-55 Washington treaties described above
reserving to Indians the right to fish at their "usual and accustomed places" "in
common with the whites." He writes that Indians likely understood this
language to mean that they would maintain control over their fishing practices,
consistent with customary law and kinship relations." This view, while not
explicit in the treaty, was confirmed by the information related orally to the
Indians by the powerful Indian agent and treaty negotiator Joel Palmer-and
then passed down among the generations of Indians. As John Skannowa, a
descendant of the Wasco treaty-signer Koshkeelah explained:
The way we understood, the white man wouldn't have any use for
salmon, the berries and the roots. The white man wouldn't eat that
and didn't know what that food was .... Joel Palmer indicated that
there would be no interference with the Indians' fishing rights at all;
that the white men just weren't interested in fishing.82
77. Id. at 401-02.
78. Id.
79. See generally WILKINSON, supra note 70.
80. Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 356.
81. Fisher, Tangled Nets, supra note 54, 5-9
82. Id. at 9.
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Beyond these observations about the role of orality in treaty interpretations,
Fisher articulates the ways in which tribal languages also likely influenced
Indian treaty interpretations. For example, some Indians believed the treaty
"gave them license to avoid the reservation entirely." 3 This belief may have
reflected the manner in which the treaty was interpreted to the Indians at treaty
councils, where it was "difficult [to obtain] accurate translation[s]. ' 4
More specifically:
The fishing clause allowed Indians to erect "temporary buildings"
or "suitable houses" for curing salmon .... [T]hese words probably
translated into the Sahaptin language as "house" (niit) or "dwelling"
(ni§6ykt) rather than as "fish drying shed" (ty6wtaas). Since
families often hung fish in their homes, the distinction between the
two structures seems blurry indeed. 5
As a result of such ambiguities, "the treaties were not understood [by some
Indians] as prohibiting continued residence at or adjacent to [the] Columbia
River fisheries,"86 a reading which may have surprised the non-Indian
individuals who later acquired title to such properties. 7
Of course the question of off-reservation residential rights was not even
before the court in the Washington litigation. Indeed, the treaties were
consistently interpreted consistent with the intent of the government's lead
negotiator, Governor Stevens.88 As the Supreme Court noted in its review of
the case:
[Governor Stevens'] statement at the signing of the Treaty of Point
Elliott on Monday, January 22, 1855, was characteristic: "We want
to place you in homes where you can cultivate the soil, using
potatoes and other articles of food, and where you will be able to
pass in canoes over the waters of the Sound and catch fish and back
to the mountains to get roots and berries." 9




87. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 379 (1905) (reviewing Indian claims to
continued fishing rights on ceded lands where title was held by non-Indians, pursuant to grants
by the United States and State of Washington).
88. See Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658, 667 n.9 (1979).
89. Id.
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Stevens' statement is cited by the court for its ostensibly clear expression of
federal policy: Indians would live on the reservation while having the right to
fish off of it. Yet, one might note certain ambiguities in this paragraph:
nowhere does Stevens say that these homes would be confined to reservation
locations or that the government's desire to place Indians in homes would
cancel Indians' own desire to reside elsewhere. Moreover, Stevens'
simultaneous acknowledgment of agriculture and subsistence as food sources
might lead some Indians to believe that they could exercise a choice between
the two lifestyles. If they chose to continue fishing, Indians might reasonably
believe that they could also live at their usual and accustomed fishing areas off
the reservation. Or, as one individual learned from his ancestors:
We never moved because when the treaties were signed by Chief
Slockish at Walla Walla we reserved the right to live at our usual
and accustomed sites along the river. These sites were reserved
because they hold all of our religious sacred sites, cemeteries,
gathering sites, fishing sites and where we have always maintained
our livelihood.9"
While lawyers and academics often "debate the value and veracity of...
[Indian] oral traditions,"'" they hold great sway among tribal peoples. As
Fisher acknowledges, "[A]mong contemporary Columbia River Indians...
what the 'old people' said still informs their understanding of the treaties."92
Ultimately, of course, the important thing is that tribal people are able to
exercise treaty rights consistent with tribal understandings. In some cases, it
may not be necessary, or even desirable, for federal judges to go into extensive
detail on the meaning of tribal customary terms in the tribal language. In the
Washington case, for example, Judge Boldt recognized tribal interests in
regulating off-reservation fishing rights, along with the very limited state role
in that regard. He acknowledged traditional means of fishing regulation.
Perhaps his opinion could have been enhanced by tribal language terminology
describing fishing regulation.93 Yet, it may be that Judge Boldt's opinion
90. Fisher, Tangled Nets, supra note 54, 11.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See id. 5 ("Traditionally, the waters of the Columbia united rather than divided human
populations, and mutual dependence forged a common human bond to nch'i-w6na ('the big
river') that belied its later use as a boundary between tribes, between territories, and between
states .... Those who lived closest to the Columbia were known in the Sahaptin language as
wanapam or wanaldma, 'people of the river,' a name that denotes a spiritual connection as well
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created enough legal space for the Washington tribes to engage in interpretive
sovereignty in their actual exercise of treaty rights. Today, tribes can exercise
these treaty rights consistent with tribal language, law, and culture-at least to
the extent that the courts construe narrowly the rule allowing states to regulate
where necessary for conservation. 9 For the Columbia River tribes, this means
that they can maintain spiritual, kinship, and community values in fishing
practices, at least to a certain extent. 95
C. Tribal Court Jurisprudence
In the above subsection, I discussed federal judicial decisions that, to a
limited extent, took into account the role of tribal language in historic treaty
interpretations. In this subsection, the essay turns to cases where tribal courts
use tribal language in their re-examinations of treaties today.96 This may be a
particularly important, if not yet widespread, practice in tribal legal institutions,
many of which are actively and purposefully engaged in legal reform-with an
eye toward making tribal law more reflective of tribal norms and values. 97
as a spatial relationship .... To them, fishing rights remain more than just a means of
subsistence; they are an integral part of cultural and religious practices that define what it means
to be Indian. Before the treaties, kinship structured access to the prime fisheries of the Middle
Columbia. Although each village claimed its own fishing grounds, specific sites belonged to
individuals and families who knew them by names such as §wdyca§ (long pole) and qiyakawas
(gaffing place).").
94. See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172,204-05 (1999)
("[T]he 1837 Treaty gave the Chippewa the right to hunt, fish, and gather in the ceded territory
free of territorial, and later state, regulation, a privilege that others did not enjoy. Today, this
freedom from state regulation curtails the State's ability to regulate hunting, fishing, and
gathering by the Chippewa in the ceded lands. But this Court's cases have also recognized that
Indian treaty-based usufructuary rights do not guarantee the Indians 'absolute freedom' from
state regulation. We have repeatedly reaffirmed state authority to impose reasonable and
necessary nondiscriminatory regulations on Indian hunting, fishing, and gathering rights in the
interest of conservation.").
95. See Columbia River Inter-tribal Fish Comm'n, The Importance ofSalmon to the Tribes,
http://www.critfc.org/text/salmcult.html (last visited Jan. 14,2009) (describing role of"salmon
culture" in contemporary exercise of treaty rights). Another interpretive issue concerns the
extent to which tribes have treaty rights to commercial fishing-or fishing for trade
purposes-versus a more limited right to subsistence fishing. See DUPRIS ET AL., supra note
63, at 259-82.
96. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Rethinking Customary Law in Tribal Court
Jurisprudence, 13 MICH. J. RACE & L. 57, 59-60 (2007) (on role of tribal language in tribal
customary law).
97. The leading scholar in this regard is Robert Porter whose many articles illuminate some
of the goals and challenges associated with decolonizing tribal governments through the use of
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Consider, for example, the jurisprudence of the Navajo Supreme Court,
which is often called on to construe the terms of the 1868 treaty between the
United States and Navajo Nation. Like other courts, it is bound to construe the
treaty "as the Indians understood it." The Navajo Supreme Court has expressly
commented: "We understand this canon to mean that we have the authority to
interpret the treaty as Navaj os understand it today. That includes the knowledge
passed on to us by our ancestors through oral traditions."98
Additionally, the Navajo Supreme Court, like some other tribal courts, has
expressed a jurisprudential preference for applying Navajo Common Law over
federal and state sources of law." Given that Navajo Common Law is deeply
informed by concepts that are uniquely expressed in the Navajo language, the
Court often uses the Navajo language to describe legal concepts. In some of
these cases, the Court uses tribal language to amplify treaty concepts. These
cases do not represent a direct translation of treaty terms. Yet they serve as an
example of a tribal legal institution using tribal language to interpret and apply
legal concepts established in treaties-in cases that happen to implicate some
of the most prominent questions in the field of federal Indian law.
In the case of Means v. The District Court of the Chinle Judicial District, an
Oglala Sioux activist challenged charges filed against him in the Navajo courts
for the alleged battery of his father-in-law and another individual in an incident
occurring on the Navajo Reservation.l° Means moved to dismiss on grounds
that the Navajo Nation lacked jurisdiction over non-member Indians and that
tribal jurisdiction would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.
tribal law and tradition in contemporary governance issues. See, e.g., Robert B. Porter,
Pursuing the Path of Indigenization in the Era of Emergent International Law Governing the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 5 YALE HuM. RTs. & DEV. L.J. 123 (2002); Robert B. Porter,
Decolonizing Indigenous Governance: Observations on Restoring Greater Faith and
Legitimacy in the Government of the Seneca Nation, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 97 (1999);
Robert B. Porter, Strengthening TribalSovereignty Through Government Reform: WhatAre the
Issues?, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 82 (1997).
98. Means v. District Court of the Chinle Judicial District, No. SC-CV-61-98, at 23 n. 12
(Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation, May 19, 1999), available at http://www.tribal-institute.
org/cases/navajo/means.htm.
99. See, e.g., In re Validation of Marriage of Francisco, 16 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law
Training Program) 6113, 6115 (Navajo 1989) (deciding tribal marriage case pursuant to Navajo
custom and instructing the Tribal Council to amend the tribal code accordingly, so as not to
"allow outside law to govern domestic relations within Navajo jurisdiction"); see also Sarah
Krakoff, Illuminating the Paradox of the Domestic Dependent Nation, 83 OR. L. REv. 1109,
1138 (2004) (explaining customary law in the Navajo courts).
100. See Means, No. SC-CV-61-98, at 3.
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Constitution. °1' In an opinion relying on both treaty and Navajo common law,
the Navajo Supreme Court held that the district court did indeed have
jurisdiction over Means. 10 2 It held the tribe has criminal jurisdiction over all
Indians entering the reservation under Article II of the United States-Navajo
Nation Treaty of 1868, pointing to the treaty clauses setting apart the
reservation for the use and occupation of "Indians" (versus just Navajos) and
Article I providing for the punishment of "bad men among the whites or other
people subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."'0 3
To some extent, each of these articles is ambiguous with respect to the scope
of criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians, requiring judicial
construction. Construing the treaty as the Indians would have understood it, the
Court invoked written histories of treaty negotiations, tribal oral tradition, and
tribal custom. 1" Such evidence included numerous instances where the
Navajos informed the federal government, during treaty negotiations and
shortly thereafter, that they would punish or drive out non-Navajo wrongdoers
and the government explicitly agreed that the tribe has this power. 5 As a
result, the Court had long held that the treaty supported concurrent tribal and
U.S. jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-members on the reservation.'06
Secondly, the Court noted that the Navajo Nation quite clearly had
jurisdiction over its "members" as a matter of treaty and federal common law. '07
While Means pointed out that he was an Oglala Sioux tribal member and not
enrolled in the Navajo Nation, the Court cited to its previous decisions finding
jurisdiction over individuals who either "consented" or "assumed tribal
relations."'0 8 To apply these concepts in the present case, the Court turned to
Navajo common law-and Navajo language terminology:
While there is a formal process to obtain membership as a Navajo,
see 1 N.N.C. Sec. 751-759 (1995), that is not the only kind of
"membership" under Navajo Nation law. An individual who marries
or has an intimate relationship with a Navajo is a hadane (in-law).
The Navajo People have adoone'e or clans, and many of them are
101. See id. at 1-3.
102. See id. at 14.
103. Id. at 10-14 (citing Treaty Between the United States of America and the Navajo Tribe
of Indians, June 1, 1868, 15 Stat. 667).
104. See id. at 11-19.
105. See id. at 13-14.
106. See id. at 13.
107. Id. at 15-17.
108. Id. at 16-19.
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based upon the intermarriage of original Navajo clan members with
people of other nations. The primary clan relation is traced through
the mother, and some of the "foreign nation" clans include the "Flat
Foot-Pima clan," the "Ute people clan," the "Zuni clan," the
"Mexican clan," and the "Mescalero Apache clan." See, SaadAhaah
Sinil: Dual Language Navajo-English Dictionary, 3-4 (1986). The
list of clans based upon other peoples is not exhaustive. A hadane
or in-law assumes a clan relation to a Navajo when an intimate
relationship forms, and when that relationship is conducted within
the Navajo Nation, there are reciprocal obligations to and from
family and clan members under Navajo common law. Among those
obligations is the duty to avoid threatening or assaulting a relative
by marriage (or any other person).109
Thus the court held that Means, "by reason of his marriage to a Navajo,
longtime residence within the Navajo Nation, his activities here, and his status
as a hadane, consents to Navajo Nation criminal jurisdiction. This is not done
by 'adoption' in any formal or customary sense, but by assuming tribal relations
and establishing familial and community relationships under Navajo common
law."110
When the Ninth Circuit later heard Means' case, it upheld tribal court
jurisdiction but based it primarily on the Indian Civil Rights Act, Major Crimes
Act, and previous decisions of the Supreme Court-holding that these statutes
implicitly allowed for tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-member
Indians and that, under the Supreme Court's longstanding treatment of Indian
status as "political," these were not race-based in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause."' Conveniently, the Supreme Court had just decided these
issues in United States v. Lara, upholding the so-called "Duro Fix," a federal
statute recognizing "the inherent power of Indian tribes ... to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over all Indians."' 12 Yet, the Navajo Supreme Court's opinion is
hardly irrelevant; rather it establishes that the tribe's assertion of criminal law
over non-members is not beholden to the evolving nature of federal statutory
or common law. Rather, it is grounded in a treaty and the tribe's own
interpretation of that treaty.
109. Means, No. SC-CV-61-98, at 17-18.
110. Id. at 18.
111. See Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2005).
112. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (upholding 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)).
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There is a less well-known case where the Navajo Nation Supreme Court
took a somewhat similar approach to civil jurisdiction. In Thinn v. Navajo
Generating Station,"3 the Court addressed the issue of whether the Navajo
Nation Council waived its power to regulate employment when it entered a
lease for the operation of the Navajo Generating Station. In some respects, the
case was narrow in its factual posture, turning on the question of whether the
language of the lease "unmistakably" waived employment regulation by the
tribe with respect to two particular places of employment." 4 As a threshold
matter, however, Thinn addressed one of the most pressing questions in Indian
law today-that is, the scope of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians. The Court
framed that question again in terms of the Treaty of 1868, noting that it
provides jurisdiction over non-members. 5
The Navajo Supreme Court's approach thus departed somewhat from the
U.S. Supreme Court's tendency to decide tribal court jurisdiction under
principles of federal Indian common law. Under the Montana rule, tribes only
retain jurisdiction over non-Indians on non-Indian fee land if they have entered
into consensual relations with the tribe or the matter affects tribal health, safety,
and welfare."l 6 Each time the U.S. Supreme Court reviews a tribal jurisdiction
case, however, it expands Montana's applicability to an ever-growing set of on-
reservation property, people, and disputes, such that tribal jurisdiction over non-
Indians is now the exception rather than the rule.'
By appealing to treaty-based jurisprudence, the Navajo Supreme Court
recalled that, under Montana, a tribal court may retain jurisdiction over non-
Indians pursuant to a treaty. 18 The "exceptions"-which have recently
dominated federal court jurisprudence-only apply in the absence of a reserved
treaty or other jurisdictional right. Thus, instead of accepting the tribe's
"inherent divestiture" of authority over non-members as a matter of federal
common law, the Navajo Court found jurisdiction over non-Indians as a general
matter, pursuant to the Treaty of 1868, and applied Navajo common law to
113. See Thinn v. Navajo Generating Station, No. SC-CV-25-06 (Supreme Court of the
Navajo Nation Oct. 19, 2007), available at http://www.tribal-institute.org/opinions/2007.
NANN.0000006.htm. With thanks to Paul Spruhan, Navajo Nation Law Clerk, for alerting me
to this case.
114. Id. 23.
115. Id. 10, 22.
116. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
117. See, e.g., Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S.
353 (2001); Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709 (2008).
118. See Thinn, No. SC-CV-25-06, 22.
136 AAERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33
decide whether it existed in the present case. It did so in a portion of the
opinion relying significantly on tribal custom and language:
The federal and state governments have their legal principles that a
sovereign's police powers, an essential attribute of sovereignty,
cannot be surrendered by contract. This principle is akin to the
Navajo principle expressed herein that the Council cannot delegate
its responsibility to protect the people to another entity." 9
The trust placed with the Council to protect employment
relationships through laws and regulations cannot be handed over
wholesale to a non-Navajo entity; that would be a betrayal of the
trust.
Under Fundamental Law, the leaders do not ever lay down this trust
and the laws because a leader is taught that they must find the
solution, for it is always available. Naat'aanii inhiigo ei t'aa nantl'a
doo t'aa nahontl'ala, haala lahgoo t'aa nistl'a dahwiizt'i' akondi,
Dine Bibeehaz'aanii doo hane' binahji' baantsahakeeso ei choo 'iil
doo hasih ntsahakeesigii beego ei t'aa bik'ee'aan hodeeztT' doo
ch'idahwiiztT', doo inda bikaa haadahwiizt'i'. Diyin Dine'e Ts'aa'
hadeiidiilaaigii ei t'aa akot'eigo yil hadadeiidiilaala; yah 'ahoot'i',
alheehonit'i'doo ch'eehonit'i', doo ei t'oo dadesstl'oo da. Binahji'ei
t'aa hat'eigi shii hanahat'a' bee nistl'ajiyaago, hanahat'a' bee
hazhdinoodzii' doo ajisiihgoda ei doo hanahat'a' doo
habeehaz 'aanii doo t'oo ni' nizhdooleelda, hatsodizin doo haane' ei
bee bikaa' haazhdoodaal doo bee nistl'ahazt'i'ee bee hozhoogo
bik'idiyaa nizhdooleel doo bi'aazh doo gaal. 12
0
As explained above, and as demonstrated in the design of the sacred
wedding basket, a leader through adherence to the laws, the analysis
of the stories of the Dine journey, and a positive approach will find
a solution (bi'a 'iidza) around, through, or over that which confronts
the people.'
21
As a matter of fundamental Navajo Law, then, the Court held: "[T]here is no
unmistakable waiver in the lease, as such waiver is inconsistent with Navajo
119. Id. 40.
120. Id. 29-30. Some conventions of Navajo orthography used in the Navajo Nation
Supreme Court's original opinion may not be reproduced here.
121. Id.
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principles of leadership responsibility to the people."'' 2 Moreover, the Court
attempted to bolster the holding against future challenges. The Court
acknowledged, for example, that in Arizona Public Service Co. v. Aspaas, 77
F.3d 1128 (1996), the Ninth Circuit had held the Navajo Nation lacked power
to regulate a different employment operation under a "virtually identical lease
provision.' '2 3 Yet, the Court noted that the Ninth Circuit had failed to consider
the reserved powers doctrine or Navajo law under which "the Council's power
to waive laws and to delegate legislative authority is not absolute.' 2 4 The
Court concluded emphatically, "[T]he Circuit Court is without authority to alter
that interpretation. Like interpretations of state law by the highest court of a
state, federal courts must defer to this Court's interpretation of Navajo law.'
125
The Means and Thinn cases, along with other Navajo judicial opinions
interpreting the Treaty of 1868, are acts of interpretive sovereignty. As the
Navajo court has clearly realized, treaties maybe instruments of federal law, yet
they play a significant role in determining the scope of tribal jurisdiction. Thus,
treaties, like legislation promulgated by the tribe, must be infused with tribal
law and culture if they are to play a role in decisions that promote and resolve
contemporary conflicts in Indian Country with internal legitimacy. The Navajo
opinions suggest that such treaty interpretation will rely, in part, on certain
concepts uniquely expressed in Navajo.
Contemporary acts of interpretive sovereignty that rely on tribal language
raise a number of questions. Were the non-Navajo parties in Means and Thinn
disadvantaged because they were unlikely to have a working knowledge of
Navajo language concepts?'26 Such questions extend beyond the issue of non-
members. Indeed, as Matthew Fletcher has posited, the entire project of
applying customary law may depend on the extent to which the tribal
community has retained its language. 27 While the Navajo Nation has a
relatively high level of Navajo language fluency, even it shows diminishing
numbers in younger generations. 28 Does the practice of interpretive sovereignty
122. Id. 31.
123. Id. 15, 34. Paragraph 34 also raises, but does not decide, the question of whether
holdings of the Ninth Circuit are binding on the Navajo Supreme Court.
124. Id. at 35.
125. Id.
126. Compare with Bethany Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over Non-
Members in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047 (2005) (study of non-members'
experiences in Navajo Nation court system).
127. See Fletcher, supra note 96, at 59-60.
128. See Krakoff, supra note 99, at 1143-44; see also ETHNOLOGUE: LANGUAGES OF THE
WORLD (Raymond G. Gordon ed., 2005) (listing "living languages" around the world and
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require judges who are fluent in the tribal language? 29 What about parties and
advocates? Such questions may be particularly pressing "in tribal communities
that are (for lack of a better word) assimilated, where the few members are
surrounded and outnumbered by nonmembers, and where the tribal language
is all but dead, customary law is extremely difficult to discover, understand, and
apply."' 30 The utility of tribal language in treaty interpretation,131 and other
tribal lawmaking, thus raises questions that can only be addressed by each tribe,




Although this essay argues for increased attention to the role of tribal
languages in treaty interpretation, it is not contemplating these issues on a blank
slate. I draw from a rich tradition of scholarship contemplating treaty
interpretation issues that analyzes the Marshall model of interpretation. For the
most part, such scholarship has not called for the use of tribal language in treaty
interpretation. 32 My aim is not to indicate a preference among these scholarly
approaches; instead I offer a brief description of each approach as a basis for
later consideration of the ways in which its analysis might be further informed
by attention to tribal language issues.
providing statistics including numbers of speakers for many indigenous languages).
129. See Fletcher, supra note 96, at 90 ("Navajo judges, for example, must be fluent in the
language of the Navajo people. A clear understanding of the language, with all its nuances and
complexities, is essential to finding tribal customs and traditions. For many tribal communities,
the law is encoded right into the language--and the stories generated from the language. A mere
translation of the stories into English may leave out fundamental fine distinctions, subtle
nuances, and even correct meaning. A native speaker would be able to use the language as a
means for discovering the law. But, as the realities of tribal communities dictate, there are few
tribal judges who are native speakers. This source, while having the potential of being the finest
source available, does not solve the problem for most tribal courts.").
130. See id. at 59-60.
131. Joyce Tekahnawiiaks King, The Value of Water and the Meaning of Water Lawfor the
Native Americans Known as the Haudenosaunee, 16 CoRNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 449, 466
(2007) (describing process of developing Haudenosaunee Position Paper on the Great Lakes,
in which treaties and natural law, both informed by tribal language concepts, are cited as
support for "Haudenosaunee's inherent sovereignty over the waters .... ajurisdictional right to
control our own Haudenosaunee territories and the water within them,... [and responsibility
to act] as a voice for the water.").
132. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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In two of the most influential articles on the topic of treaty interpretation,
scholars focus on the "clear statement rule" under which courts require a clear
statement of congressional intent to abrogate a treaty right (which is otherwise
reserved to the tribe). 13 3 This rule operates in conjunction with the other Indian
canons of construction calling for judges to construe treaties liberally in favor
of Indians (and against the government), interpreting terms as the Indians would
have understood them.
While the scholars agree on the importance and utility of these basic rules of
treaty interpretation, they arrive at this view via differing conceptions of treaties
themselves. Charles Wilkinson and John Volkman argue that, as agreements
representing bilateral negotiations, treaties are akin to "contracts.' 34 Indians
are entitled to treaty rights because they "fought hard, bargained extensively,
and made major concessions in return for such rights.' 3'  Therefore, the
resulting agreements, concerning property, sovereignty, and cultural interests,
are legally-binding contracts of a "high order.', 136 But because Indian treaties
did not usually reflect arms-length transactions between equals, they are akin
to contracts of adhesion.' The federal government often wielded the upper
hand (as a result of its political power, willingness to employ dishonorable
tactics, and control ofthe drafting language).3 3 These historical circumstances,
along with the federal government's ongoing trust obligations to tribes, have
"led to the development of canons of construction designed to rectify the
inequality.', 3 9 It is for these reasons, according to Wilkinson and Volkman, that
courts should apply to Indian treaties the rule that construes contract language
against the drafter and in favor of the weaker party. 40 Under this rule, treaty
rights should only be abrogated by an "express" congressional statement - and
not by ambiguous language or actions. 4 '
Philip Frickey, by contrast, characterizes treaties as "constitutional"
instruments structuring the political relationship between Indian nations and the
133. See Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty
Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth "--How Long a Time
Is That?, 63 CAL. L. REv. 601 (1975); Frickey, Marshalling, supra note 12.
134. See Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 133, at 617-18.
135. See id at 603.
136. Id. at 603, 604-06.
137. Seeid. at617.
138. See id. at 610-12.
139. Id. at 617.
140. See id. at 617-18.
141. Id. at 645.
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United States.142 Treaties, like constitutions, appropriately place limits on
lawmakers while giving them flexibility to govern in a functional manner.'43
The clear statement rule places some limits on the federal government's
colonial mission while still giving it the power to legislate.'" The rule, along
with the other canons, also reflect the "spirit" of treaty negotiations in which
two sovereigns were negotiating the structure and substance of their ongoing
political relationship.'45 Under this vision, Frickey firmly rejects the notions
that the Indian canons are meant to "protect disadvantaged minorities,"
"promote equality," or "combat political powerlessness."' 46 Instead the treaty
abrogation doctrine "protects against all but clear repeals of values rooted in the
spirit of Indian treaties" as a matter of structural and institutional preference for
the ongoing constitutional arrangement between sovereigns.'47
While Frickey departs from Wilkinson and Volkman in some critical
respects, these scholars' common focus on the clear statement rule offers
mutual reinforcement to Marshall's treaty interpretation methodology. That is,
when reviewing courts construe treaties, their task is to apply a general
preference for the Indian position, either as a structural or remedial matter. The
admonition to interpret treaty language "as the Indians would have understood
it" may not be a literal command to delve into the Indians' specific intent, either
at the time of the treaty or of the litigation.148 This approach may reflect a
common view of treaties, whether contractual or constitutional, as instruments
that were largely prepared by the government and signed by the Indian
parties-rather than instruments truly emerging from the mutual intent of two
negotiating partners. 14 Or perhaps it reflects that, in the adversarial world of
142. See generally Frickey, Marshalling, supra note 12.
143. See id. 409-10
144. See id. at 412-18.
145. See id. at 410-18.
146. See id. at 425.
147. Id. at 417; see also United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1905) ("[W]e have
said we will construe a treaty with the Indians as that unlettered people understood it, and as
justice and reason demand, in all cases where power is exerted by the strong over those to whom
they owe care and protection, and counterpoise the inequality by the superior justice which
looks only to the substance of the right, without regard to technical rules.") (internal citations
and quotations omitted).
148. Compare with Frickey, Marshalling, supra note 12, at 418 n.158 (stating that the
canons are "designed... to promote broad interpretations of provisions that benefit Indians")
(emphasis added).
149. See RENNARD STRICKLAND, TONTO's REVENGE: REFLECTIONS ON AMERICAN INDIAN
CuLTuRE AND PoLIcY 104 (1997) ("I cannot be a consensus historian and willingly pretend that
'the Colombian Exchange' was a consensual experience. I am by training a legal historian, and
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treaty litigation, there are often only two positions: the Indian's and
government's (whether federal or state). The commentators' (and Marshall's)
goal may be to interpret the treaty broadly enough to afford the Indians latitude
to exercise their specific intent on their own terms, in practice. Thus it is
appropriate to construe treaties strictly against the government, either because
it is the political entity bearing the structural burden of the federal-Indian trust
relationship (in Frickey's view) or because it is the contractual entity wielding
the upper hand in federal-Indian transactions (in Wilkinson and Volkman's
view).
Robert A. Williams, Jr., offers a third vision of treaties and interpretation,
reading them as unique instruments of intercultural diplomacy, revealing both
Indian and European traditions of "law and peace."'15 He focuses on a time
period (1600-1800) when treaty partners encountered each other on relatively
equal footing and each side had sufficient power to meaningfully direct
negotiations.' Secondly, Williams is interested in critiquing a view of federal
Indian law "either expressed or implied, that the legal rules and principles
adhered to in the course of this country's historical dealings with Indian peoples
are the exclusive by-products of the Western legal tradition brought to America
from the Old World." '152 Evident in Chief Justice Marshall's opinions, this
perspective tends to see the law (and Indians' legal "salvation" from the
crushing powers of colonization) as non-Indian creations. By contrast,
Williams argues that Indians, despite power inequities, maintained their own
legal traditions and engaged European and American negotiators on these
terms.
In his review of Iroquois, Cherokee, Choctaw, Powhatan, and other tribes'
treaty encounters with Europeans, Williams focuses on specific cultural
contexts. He argues that each tribe or confederacy had its own legal tradition
I object to the concept of discovery and western settlement as a mutual or equitable exchange.
In my view, Indians gave--Europeans took."). To the extent that the United States "imposed"
treaty terms, tribal intent may be less discemable. Yet, Frickey has recognized that "the canons
call upon the judge to become sensitized to the Indian interests in the case," Frickey,
Marshalling, supra note 12, at 418 n.158, and Wilkinson describes the Chippewa as savvy
negotiators who insisted on certain specific provisions in their negotiations over hunting and
fishing rights, see Charles F. Wilkinson, To Feel Summer in the Spring: The Treaty Fishing
Rights of the Wisconsin Chippewa, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 375, 385-86 [hereinafter Wilkinson,
Summer]. Still these scholars seem to focus on the importance ofjudicial treaty constructions
that favor Indian interests in a broad (versus specific) sense.
150. WILLIAMS,supra note 1, at 10.
151. Many agree that circumstances changed by the 1800s when the United States used its
military power and other forms of duress to dictate, rather than negotiate, treaty terms.
152. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 6.
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that must be examined to understand both treaty negotiations and the resulting
terms. The Iroquois brought a tradition of confederacy, wampum, and kinship
to their treaty encounters, whereas Cherokees had a strong sense of clan
obligations in their customary law. 5 3  Many tribes solemnized treaty
agreements with rituals including gift-giving, smoking a sacred pipe, historical
orations, and naming ceremonies.154 To some extent, Williams argues, treaties
executed with the Cherokees, Haudenosaunee, Wyandots, Delawares, and
others reflected these traditions. Evidence of indigenous legal traditions is
documented both in records of the negotiating processes (showing that treaty
partners conducted certain rituals) and the treaties' substantive terms (reflecting
mutual obligations and a sense of kinship between peoples).1
55
As these examples suggest, Williams' project is to re-examine treaties for
evidence of "the legal visions of American Indian peoples."' 56  His
methodology is more complicated than application of the "clear statement rule"
to construe treaties narrowly in favor of the Indian position and against the
government's position. Indeed, he seems to reject the notion that treaties could
be reduced to dichotomous choices. Instead he starts with the plain language
of treaties and then acts as somewhat of a legal anthropologist, considering
treaty terms in the context of cultural and historical information. While his
intent is not to articulate a rule of interpretation, Williams' implication is that
today's federal Indian law should reflect the intercultural spirit and substance
of those early treaties. 57 In this regard his approach is consistent with that of
Frickey and Wilkinson, 5' but more insistent on interpreting treaties in light of
specific tribal legal and cultural traditions.
My own interest in treaty interpretation is deeply informed by the scholarly
antecedents described above. It takes from Wilkinson and Volkman the notion
that the Indian canons are justifiable as a matter of historical equity and from
Frickey that they are deeply embedded in the structural and institutional
framework of federal Indian law. From Williams, I am inspired to take
153. Id. at 51-61, 63-66 (describing Iroquois practices); id. at 66-68 (describing Cherokee
practices).
154. Id. at 75-82.
155. Id. at 98-123.
156. Id. at 7.
157. Id. at 122-23.
158. Notably, in a later article, Wilkinson devotes close attention to issues of culture and
language in the interpretation of Chippewa treaties. Wilkinson, Summer, supra note 149, at
384-89. Both Wilkinson and Frickey ultimately call for treaties to inform an intercultural,
negotiated approach to contemporary Indian law, much in the best spirit of the treaties
themselves. See id. at 404; Frickey, Adjudication, supra note 46, at 1779-84.
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seriously the possibility that, if examined in their cultural context, many treaties
will reveal Indian as well as European and American legal traditions. My goal
is to propose a next step in this rich tradition of treaty interpretation scholarship.
The question is what might we learn by using tribal languages as an interpretive
device? Here I argue that this inquiry is informed by developments in the fields
of literature and linguistics, which in turn resonate with important trends in
Indian Country.
B. Literature
There is, in the field of American Indian literature, a movement that
identifies Indian writing as an act of political self-determination in which Indian
voices should be prioritized.159 As one scholar writes: "Native literature, and
Native literary criticism, written by Native authors is part of sovereignty: Indian
people exercising the right to present images of themselves and to discuss those
images." 160 While "there is no one pure or authoritative act that constitutes
Native literary criticism," the assertion of a tribal voice affirms Indians as
"active agents in history, innovators of new ways, of Indian ways, of thinking
and being and speaking and authoring in this world created by colonial
contact. '161 This approach echoes, to some extent, Williams' work on treaties,
suggesting that scholars should look closely at Indian roles in creating texts,
whether literary or legal. But literary criticism is particularly focused on the
expressive quality of Indian voices, a focus that can inspire a sharper look at
issues of language in treaty interpretation.
62
159. Scott Richard Lyons, Rhetorical Sovereignty: What Do American Indians Want from
Writing?, 51 C. COMPOSITION & COMM. 447 (2000).
160. CRAIG WOMACK, RED ON RED: NATIVE AMERICAN LITERARY SEPARATISM 14 (1999).
For a new work, see SEAN KICUMMAH TEUTON, RED LAND, RED POWER: GROUNDING
KNOWLEDGE IN THE AMERICAN INDIAN NOVEL (2008) (advancing a "tribal realist" approach to
literary criticism).
161. See WOMACK, supra note 160, at 6.
162. Susan Kalter argues for a "complete reconsideration of the place of treaties in both
general and intellectual history" in light of developments in history, linguistics, Native
American Studies, and literary theory. KALTER, supra note 48, at x. Similar to my claims here,
Kalter suggests that contemporary Native American literary theory should inform the project
of treaty interpretation, in particular by shedding light on issues of oral tradition, language, and
relationships among peoples. Id. at ix-xiv ("It is my hope that this edition will help connect
eighteenth-century centers of Native American thought and intellectual exchange to those more
contemporary exercises of political and intellectual sovereignty.") (citing the works of Jace
Weaver, Robert Warrior, and Gerald Vizenor).
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
Beyond general insistence on Indian participation in interpretation, 63 a group
of "literary nationalists" further emphasize the distinctiveness of particular
tribal worldviews and experiences." Craig Womack, for example, imagines
a critic who is "not satisfied with explicating Creek texts if he has never tried
his hand at creating anything Creek himself."'65 Womack then analyzes the
work of several Creek authors, situating their work in Creek ceremonial life,
resistance movements, oral tradition, and experiences with statehood. His goal
in these discussions is to "open[] up a dialogue among Creek people,
specifically, and Native people, more generally, regarding what constitutes
meaningful literary efforts."'66 Through such work, Womack attempts to meet
what he describes as "responsibility as a Creek-Cherokee critic to try to include
Creek perspectives in approaches to Native literature, especially given the
wealth of Creek wisdom on the subject.'
167
In a somewhat similar vein, the Cherokee critic Daniel Heath Justice
analyzes Cherokee-authored literary works in what he sees as two strands of
Cherokee experience-the Chickamauga consciousness of resistance and
Beloved Path of engagement--describing his work as "tribal-centered
scholarship.' '06 Osage scholar Robert Warrior engages in a comparative work,
juxtaposing the writings of Osage author John Joseph Matthews with those of
the Standing Rock Sioux writer Vine Deloria, with the goal of uncovering
tribal-specific intellectual traditions.
69
163. Thus some Indian literary critics depart from the view that Indian identity is irrelevant
to the production and criticism of Indian literature. For proponents of the so-called "anti-
essentialist" view, see generally ELVIRA PULITANO, TOWARD A NATIVE AMERICAN CRITICAL
THEORY (2003) (criticizing the "failed logic, internal contradictions, and linguistic
inconsistencies" that she finds in certain literary works by American Indians and describing
these as pandering to activist nostalgia separatism and essentialist conceptions of Native
American identity). See also ARNOLD KRUPAT, THE TURN TO THE NATIVE: STUDIES IN
CRITICISM& CULTURE (1996); DAvID TREuER, NATIVE AMERICAN FICTION: A USER GUIDE 195
(2006) ("Native American fiction does not exist.").
164. See JACE WEAVER, CRAIG S. WOMACK & ROBERT WARRIOR, AMERICAN INDIAN
LITERARY NATIONALISM (2005); Daniel Heath Justice, Indigenous Literary Nationalism,
http://www.danielheathjustice.com/scholarship.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
165. WOMACK, supra note 160, at 20.
166. Id. at 1.
167. Id.
168. DANIEL HEATH JUSTICE, OUR FIRE SURVIVES THE STORY: A CHEROKEE LITERARY
HISTORY (2006).
169. See ROBERT WARRIOR, TRIBAL SECRETS: RECOVERING AMERICAN INDIAN
INTELLECTUAL TRADITIONS (1994).
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In all of their efforts, the literary nationalists express the hope that "tribes,
and tribal members, will have an increasingly important role in evaluating tribal
literatures."' 7 ° My hope is that tribes and tribal members will have a similarly
important role in treaty interpretation. The assertion of tribal voices in treaty
interpretation, like the assertion of tribal literary interpretation, allows Indians
to "author their own destinies as distinct peoples with discrete political status
in this world."'' This practice is critical in the re-examination of treaties that
dictate tribes' legal status today.
C. Linguistics
If we can agree with the Indian literary nationalists that Indian voices play
an important role in the interpretation of tribal-specific texts, the remaining
question is whether Indian voices may be uniquely expressed in tribal
languages. Among linguists, it has become an unremarkable proposition that
cultural groups express concepts differently through language.'72 One linguistic
anthropologist offers a simple illustration of this phenomenon, explaining:
"Russian has a single word, ruka, for a part of the body that English divides into
two words, handand arm, suggest[ing] that the speakers of Russian and English
attach different degrees of importance to naming those body parts."' 73 While
this notion of "linguistic relativity" is well-accepted, scholars debate the
question of "linguistic determination," that is, whether language "organize[s]
the world for us or just expresses how our culture has taught us to organize the
world." 
174
Some of these issues extend beyond the scope of the present essay. 75 Yet,
recent work in linguistic anthropology reflects that, at least in some
communities, tribal people believe that certain concepts are uniquely expressed
170. See WOMACK, supra note 160, at 1.
171. See WEAVER ET AL., supra note 164, at xiv.
172. OTTENHEIMER, supra note 17, at 1-29.
173. Id. at 16; see also id. at 29 ("[E]thnosemantics provides an important and useful
technique for learning another language and culture through its system of categorizations.")
174. Id. at 29.
175. My review of the literature from linguistics, linguistic anthropology, and related
disciplines is, at this point, somewhat limited. For several sources on indigenous language and
linguistic issues, see KEITH H. BASSO, WESTERN APACHE LANGUAGE AND CULTURE: ESSAYS
IN LINGUISTIC ANTHROPOLOGY (1990); KEITH H. BASSO, WISDOM SITS IN PLACES: LANDSCAPE
AND LANGUAGE AMONG THE WESTERN APACHE (1996); DELL HYMES, FOUNDATIONS IN
SOCIOLINGUISTICS: AN ETHNOGRAPHIC APPROACH (1974); DELL HYMES, "IN VAIN I TRIED TO
TELL YOU": ESSAYS IN NATIVE AMERICAN ETHNOPOETICS (1981); and numerous sources cited
in JUSTIN B. RICHLAND, ARGUING WITH TRADITION: THE LANGUAGE OF LAW IN HOPI TRIBAL
COURT 169-78 (2008).
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in tribal languages. Justin Richland's study on language used in the Hopi tribal
court system, while not focused on treaty interpretations, offers several rich
examples of the function of tribal language in legal proceedings. 176 He recounts
proceedings in which litigants, advocates, and judges alike express a preference
for speaking in Hopi, even if they are fluent in English.
177
Richland specifically examines cases pertaining to property and inheritance
in which Hopi custom was often key to resolving the dispute. In one case, for
example, a Hopi lay advocate prompted his client to "clearly explain [her
position] in Hopi," a request which Richland reads as "suggest[ing] a belief that
the proper sense of this claim is communicable only in Hopi - that this claim
is an expression not of the daughter's sole possessory interests but of Hopi
traditions of matrilineal inheritance.' ' s As another advocate explained about
a concept expressed in English: "It's said different in Hopi, it doesn't have as
much effect because I can't use my language."' 179 This is because, when it
comes to sensitive issues of property and kinship, "You can't separate Hopi and
religion and land, language, court, constitution. It's all tied up into one."'80
Hopi cases of inheritance implicate not only familiar Anglo-American
concepts of "testamentary intent" and "capacity", but also particular Hopi
questions of who is entitled to inherit property. Relevant factors may include
how often a person who no longer resides in the village must return in order to
retain possessory interests in land; whether an individual is fulfilling clan
relationships; and if a property claimant is able, as a matter of gender and social
roles, to maintain property used for ceremonial purposes. 8' From the parties
and advocates' perspectives, these Hopi traditions are uniquely reflected in the
Hopi language. One advocate went so far as to say that she had to speak Hopi
"in order to adequately represent my client" on issues of "land and tradition.' ' 82
She felt so strongly that she lapsed into Hopi to emphasize the importance of
the subject matter before the judge even ruled on the request.'83
Richland's work indicates, moreover, that some of the Hopi parties choose
to speak in Hopi not only out of a need to be precisely understood, but also as
a matter of political self-determination. One advocate, for example, challenged
the opposing lawyer's objection to the use of Hopi language saying:
176. See RIcHLAND, supra note 175, at 97-105.
177. Id. at 98.
178. Id. at 99.
179. Id. at 106.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 56-57, 69, 98-99.
182. Id. at 102.
183. Id. ("I' hapiyep-yeppu 'himu..." "This truly here- here now is something [we]...").
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I think the [opposing lawyer] is being ignorant to the fact that we are
Hopi and this is a Hopi court of law. [T]he reasons why.., things
were developed the Constitution, the Hopi Court, was for the benefit
of the Hopi people, not for the benefit of the people who can't
understand English . . . . I think we should be honoring that
opportunity to express [ourselves in Hopi].'8
In Richland's view such advocacy "link[s] the witness's right to use Hopi to the
tribe's contemporary legal institutions and the self-governance it instantiates.
.and to the distinctive pragmatic and affective capacities that Hopi affords the
witness, which an English translation might not adequately capture ('and maybe
the best way for her to communicate her feelings').'
' 85
Richland's ultimate project is broader than the above excerpts would imply;
indeed he is concerned with the many ways in which Hopi ideas of tradition are
shaped in the judicial process. Yet, Richland's work is useful in
conceptualizing the role of language in treaty interpretation. In particular, it
suggests Chief Justice Marshall's method of treaty interpretation may (1) fail
to capture legal concepts as they are uniquely expressed in tribal languages and
traditions and (2) suppress opportunities for tribal people to realize the political
self-determination that comes from use of tribal languages in legal processes.
D. More Questions
When we return to the legal opinions giving rise to the Indian canons, we
might reflect on such lessons from literary and linguistic theory. To some
extent, Marshall realized that a "hunting ground" might not be a "hunting
ground" to all peoples. Yet, he never went that step further and asked what a
"hunting ground" actually meant to the Cherokees during the treaty
negotiations. Inspired by both the literary nationalists and linguist
anthropologists, then, we could pose some additional questions about treaty
interpretation.
When, for example, translators explained to the Cherokees the various "land"
articles in the Treaty of Hopewell, which words did they use?'86 And which
words did the Cherokee leaders use? With respect to Article Four allotting land
184. Id. at 104.
185. Id. at 99.
186. For a sampling of Cherokee dictionaries and glossaries, see DuRBIN FEELING,
CHEROKEE-ENGLISH DICTIONARY (William Pulte ed., 1975); PRENTICE ROBINSON, EASY
CHEROKEE DICTIONARY (1996); Cherokee Nation, Dikaneisdi (Word List), http://www.
cherokee.org/Culture/Lexicon/Default.aspx (last visited Jan. 14, 2009).
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for hunting grounds, did they employ a phrase that would literally translate as
hunting ground or something broader such as land, nation, or territory?187 What
did they understand to be the nature of the land rights described in the treaty? 8
Was it fee title ownership and territorial dominion-or a mere hunting
ground-as any of these terms might have been defined in the European sense?
Did the Cherokees have a distinct conception of a "hunting ground" in the
Cherokee language and was that perceptive operative in their understanding of
Article Four? How did they construe the federal government's authority to
"manage[] their affairs" as set forth in Article Nine? Did the Cherokees
conceive the treaty as reflective of Cherokee, European, or an emergent form
of property and governance norms?8 9
Studying Cherokee treaty interpretations is a substantial undertaking.
Fortunately there is a rich body of historical and legal materials on the
Cherokee treaty era.'9° There are also a number of works analyzing the
187. See, e.g., AJALAGI NUSDV NvGOHV ELOHI: CHEROKEE VISION OF ELOHI (Virginia M.
Sobral & Howard L. Meredith eds., Wesley Proctor trans., 1997) (book-length bilingual
treatment of the Cherokee concept of "elohi", which is sometimes translated as land, earth,
culture, religion, and law).
188. Another source on Cherokee land traditions might be available in traditional stories that
often describe land use for hunting, agricultural, residential, ceremonial, and other purposes.
See, e.g., JAMES MOONEY, MYTHS OF THE CHEROKEES AND SACRED FORMULAS OF THE
CHEROKEES (2007) (combined reprint of two previous Mooney books); JACK FREDERICK
KILPATRICK & ANNA GRIrrS KILPATRICK, FRIENDS OF THUNDER: FOLKTALES OF THE
OKLAHOMA CHEROKEES (1995); BARBARA R. DUNCAN, LIVING STORIES OF THE CHEROKEE
(1998). Compare with JOHN BORROWS, RECOVERING CANADA: THE RESURGENCE OF
INDIGENOUS LAW (2002) (describing how law ofFirst Nations peoples, including that expressed
in traditional stories, influences Canadian law).
189. For a contemporary view of some Cherokee property law and norms, see Stacy L.
Leeds, The Burning of Blackacre: A Step Toward Reclaiming Tribal Property Law, 10-SPG
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 491 (2001).
190. A sampling ofthe many sources on Cherokee history preceding and during the Removal
era includes THE LIFE AND TIMES OF HON. WM. P. Ross OF THE CHEROKEE NATION (Mrs.
William P. Ross ed., 1893); EMMET STARR, HISTORY OF THE CHEROKEE INDIANS AND THEIR
LEGENDS AND FOLK LORE (1921); GRANT FOREMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL (1932); ALTHEA BASS,
CHEROKEE MESSENGER (1936); EuAS BOUDINOT: CHEROKEE AND His AMERICA (1941);
MARION L. STARKEY, THE CHEROKEE NATION (1946); THE REMOVAL OF THE CHEROKEE
NATION: MANIFEST DESTINY OR NATIONAL DISHONOR (Louis Filler & Allen Guttman eds.,
1962); GRACE STEELE WOODWARD, THE CHEROKEES (1963); JACK GREGORY & RENNARD
STRICKLAND, SAM HOUSTON WITH THE CHEROKEES: 1829-1833 (1967); JOHN PHILIP REID, A
LAw OF BLOOD: THE PRIMrrivE LAW OF THE CHEROKEE NATION (1970); THURMAN WILKINSON,
CHEROKEE TRAGEDY: THE RIDGE FAMILY AND THE DECIMATION OF A PEOPLE (1970);
STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPIRITS, supra note 58; DUANE KING, THE CHEROKEE INDIAN
NATION: A TROUBLED HISTORY (1979); GARY E. MOULTON, JOHN ROSS: CHEROKEE CHIEF
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Cherokee language in non-legal settings. 9 ' Yet, there has been relatively little
scholarship considering the specific role of Cherokee tribal language in treaty
interpretation. If undertaken, study should be informed by careful work with
primary documents, contemporary linguists, and tribal members and leaders to
consider various possible Cherokee interpretations of the treaties and
ramifications of such interpretations. 92 What might it mean if these sources
suggest Cherokee treaty interpretations that depart from Marshall's view? What
if Cherokee conceptions are broader, narrower, or altogether different from the
judicial version? At this late date, 170 years after the Trail of Tears, could
Cherokee perspectives have any bearing on the tribe's legal relationship with
the United States? 93 How would evidence about specific Cherokee or other
tribal viewpoints on treaties influence courts' and scholars' approaches to treaty
(1978); THE PAPERS OF CHIEF JOHN ROss 1807-1839, 1840-1866 (Gary Moulton ed., 1985);
CHEROKEE REMOVAL: BEFORE AND AFTER (William L. Anderson ed., 1991); WILMA P.
MANKILLER, A CHIEF AND HER PEOPLE (1993); THE CHEROKEE REMOVAL: A BRIEF HISTORY
WITH DOCUMENTS (Theda Purdue & Michael D. Green eds., 1995); THE BRAINERD JOURNAL:
A MISSION TO THE CHEROKEES, 1817-1823 (Joyce B. Phillips & Paul Gary Phillips eds., 1998);
TIM ALAN GARRISON, THE LEGAL IDEOLOGY OF REMOVAL: THE SOUTHERN JUDICIARY AND THE
SOVEREIGNTY OF NATIVE AMERICAN NATIONS (2002); JILL NORGREN, THE CHEROKEE CASES:
Two LANDMARK FEDERAL DECISIONS IN THE FIGHT FOR SOVEREIGNTY (2004); CHARLES C.
ROYCE, THE CHEROKEE NATION OF INDIANS (Kessinger Publ'g 2007) (1887); THEDA PURDUE
& MICHAEL D. GREEN, THE CHEROKEE NATION AND THE TRAIL OF TEARS (2007).
191. See, e.g., THE SHADOW OF SEQUOYAH: SOCIAL DOCUMENTS OF THE CHEROKEES: 1862-
1964 (Jack Frederick Kilpatrick & Anna Gritts Kilpatirck eds., 1976); MARGARET BENDER,
SIGNS OF CHEROKEE CULTURE: SEQUOYAH'S SYLLABARY IN EASTERN CHEROKEE LIFE (2002).
192. Although it was not a treaty case, a recent controversy referenced tribal language
terminology in determining contemporary marriage rights under tribal law. See Cherokee Court
Dismisses Gay Marriage Suit, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 4,2005, available at http://www.boston.
com/news/nation/articles/2005/08/04/cherokeecourtdismissesgaymarriagesuit (noting that
same-sex marriage case before tribal supreme court included testimony on the Cherokee
language meanings of terminology designating spouses as "cooker" and "companion" under
traditional law).
193. A "live" treaty issue exists, for example, in tribal and federal litigation over the
enrollment status of Cherokee "freedmen." See, e.g., Vann v. Kempthorne, 467 F. Supp. 2d 56
(D.D.C. 2006) (reviewing claims of descendants of former slaves claiming citizenship in the
Cherokee Nation based on the Treaty of 1866). The Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma has also
litigated and settled treaty rights to the Arkansas River in the recent past. United States v.
Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S. 700 (1987) (holding that the Cherokee Nation is not entitled to just
compensation for damage to treaty guaranteed riverbed interests caused by the federal
government's exercise of navigational servitude). For other contemporary Cherokee treaty
issues, see Ezra Rosser, The Nature ofRepresentation: The Cherokee Right to a Congressional
Delegate, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 91 (2005) (analyzing the unresolved question, under the Treaty
of New Echota of 1835, of a Cherokee right to representation in Congress).
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interpretation? Will such information have any role in tribal lawmaking or be
treated as legal history with limited utility in contemporary affairs?
Beyond specific tribal contexts, studying tribal languages in treaty
interpretation could raise various theoretical and practical questions for
scholars. Whether we view the treaty endeavor as contractual-remedial,
constitutional-structural, or intercultural-diplomatic, what would it mean to
apply the treaties as the Indians "actually" understood them and as they
understand them today? In the contracts realm, additional evidence about the
parties' original and contemporary understandings might deepen analysis on the
"mistake," "duress," "fraud," "changed circumstances," and "adhesion
contract" questions sometimes asked about the deals struck by treaty parties.
In examining treaties as constitutional documents, language studies could be
useful information to various schools of thought, including original intent and
dynamic interpretation, and perhaps give more meaningful content to the
political relationship between the United States and tribes. As a matter of
intercultural diplomacy, a deeper understanding of treaty terms could enhance
the functionality of treaties as constantly-renewing instruments of trust and
cooperation. In an ideal world, Indians and non-Indian treaty partners would
be able to meet, much like their ancestors did, to affirm the core of their
promises to one another-while also discussing the ways that the evolving
cultural and linguistic traditions of each party should inform contemporary
challenges. Of course, these are largely abstract ideas that, as a practical matter,
would need to be evaluated in light of whatever information is actually revealed
by language studies and with attention to the evidentiary, procedural, and
substantive requirements of various legal claims and forums.
V. Conclusion
In the Native American Languages Act of 1990, Congress recognized "the
rights and freedom of Native Americans to use, practice, and develop Native
American languages," including specific protections for Indian language rights
in education and public expression. 94 Subsequent legislation has made modest
funding available for language immersion programs in furtherance of these
goals. '95 Tribes, in turn, are using their often scarce resources to create language
immersion programs, train fluent speakers as instructors, and publish teaching
194. Native American Languages Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-477, 104 Stat. 1152
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2906).
195. Native American Languages Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-524, 106 Stat. 3434
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2991b-3, 2992d(e) (2006); Esther Martinez Native
American Languages Preservation Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-394, 120 Stat. 2705.
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materials. 96 Like other minorities, however, American Indians face political
and legal challenges to their efforts to secure language rights. 197 In one
particularly poignant moment, the principal chief of the Cherokee Nation was
denied the right to speak-in English-when the Oklahoma Legislature
convened to discuss an "English Only" measure before it.'9
In this era of self-determination, however, Indian people will not be silenced
by oppressive legal institutions. Indeed, the revitalization of tribal languages
plays an active role in decolonizing tribal governing institutions, transforming
them from agents of state and federal law to tools of culturally-meaningful
tribal nation building. This phenomenon is particularly apparent in the
contemporary use of tribal customary law. As the Navajo and Hopi examples
suggest, tribal customary or common law may rely significantly on traditional
community values uniquely expressed in tribal languages. It is possible that
tribal language also has a role to play in treaty interpretation beyond Indian
Country-that is, in negotiated settlements with other governments and even
in federal litigation.
This essay has attempted to make the general claim that tribal languages have
an important role to play in treaty interpretation, and to raise questions for
further research. Future research could be undertaken to re-examine certain
texts through the lens of tribal language and ultimately develop a theory
articulating the role of tribal language in treaty interpretation. Such work has
the potential to make stronger connections between tribal efforts to revitalize
language and law.
Perhaps most aspirationally, my work will engage with a broader nationwide
debate about the role of language differences in the interpretation of other legal
texts. Scholars, judges, and citizens alike argue for competing approaches to
interpretation-textualism, originalism, and dynamism-to name a few.199
196. See, e.g., JANINE JA N'O BOwEN, THE OJiBwE LANGUAGE PROGRAM: TEACHING MILLE
LACS BAND YOUTH THE OJIBWE LANGUAGE TO FOSTER A STRONGER SENSE OF CULTURAL
IDENTITY AND SOVEREIGNTY (Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development
2004), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hpaied/pubs/pub_157.htm.
197. See generally Allison M. Dussias, Waging War with Words: Native Americans'
Continuing StruggleAgainst the Suppression of Their Languages, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 901 (1999);
Allison M. Dussias, Indigenous Languages Under Siege: The Native American Experience, 3
INTERCULTURAL HuM. RTs. L. REV. 5 (2008). For an international perspective, see Julie Chi-
hye Suk, Economic Opportunities and the Protection of Minority Languages, 1 LAW & ETHIcs
OF HUM. RTS. 1 (2007).
198. Official English Legislation Passes House Committee Following Tense Hearing,
NEWSOK.COM, Apr. 2, 2008, http://newsok.com/article/3224542/1207180909 (last visited Jan.
9, 2009).
199. See, e.g., Paul Campos, That Obscure Object Of Desire: Hermeneutics And The
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These questions of interpretation often arise in contemporary cases of abortion
rights, affirmative action, same-sex marriage, and other issues that may seem
far from the Indian treaty context. Yet treaty interpretation raises broader
questions: How are various segments of our multilingual, multicultural society
affected by constitutional and statutory interpretation? Do such constituents
have a voice when it comes to interpreting legal texts that affect them? How do
we reconcile power disparities among parties to political compacts, domestic
and international? How does the law address changing societal values and the
changing nature of language itself? In illuminating these questions, the project
of interpretive sovereignty may have ramifications in Indian Country and
beyond.
Autonomous Legal Text, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1065, 1069-71 (1993) (discussing textualism,
intentionalism, and "pragmatic" interpretation).
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